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Bank supervision and central banking: 




I would like to thank the Bank of Korea and the Bank for International Settlements for 
sponsoring this seminar, “Household Debt: Implications for Monetary Policy and Financial 
Stability”, and for inviting me to participate as the keynote speaker. The planned sessions on 
mortgage finance, consumer credit and securitisation are all particularly topical and touch on 
areas that have been of keen interest, especially since July 2007, to the Federal Reserve 
and central banks throughout the world. 
Today I am going to focus my remarks on the information central banks need to make 
informed decisions during periods of financial turmoil. In particular, I am going to highlight the 
fact that non-public information about financial institutions has been extremely useful in 
understanding the current problems in US financial markets and how those problems might 
factor into monetary policy decisions and other policy matters. 
At today’s seminar we have representatives from a diverse set of countries, and in those 
countries the responsibilities of the central bank in bank supervision vary considerably. The 
Federal Reserve has supervisory responsibilities over bank holding companies as well as 
over banks that choose both to have a state charter and to be members of the Federal 
Reserve. These supervisory responsibilities, I would argue, have been instrumental in 
dealing with the current episode of financial turbulence. 
In many countries, the role of bank supervisors continues to evolve, but whatever the 
institutional arrangements that prevail in your countries, I would argue that hands-on 
supervisory experience can be critically important to the central bank during times of stress 
and can significantly improve the ability of the central bank to choose appropriate monetary 
policy and address problems related to financial stability. 
To make that argument, today I am going to discuss four areas where knowledge of 
confidential, non-public information about financial institutions has been important to central 
bankers. This is a topic that I investigated a number of years ago with co-authors Joe Peek 
and Geoff Tootell. Our research found that the confidential information available to bank 
supervisors could be used to improve central bank forecasts of inflation, unemployment and 
gross domestic product.
2 
                                                  
1   President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The views I express today are my 
own, and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Board of Governors or the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC). 
2   See J Peek, E S Rosengren and G M B Tootell, “Is Bank Supervision Central to Central Banking?” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol 114, no 2, May 1999, pp 629–53. The paper finds that confidential bank 
supervisory information could help more accurately forecast important macroeconomic variables and is useful 
to monetary policymaking. The findings suggest that the complementarity between supervisory responsibilities 
and monetary policy should be an important consideration when evaluating the structure of a central bank. 
  See also J Peek, E S Rosengren and G M B Tootell, “Does the Federal Reserve possess an exploitable 
informational advantage?” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol 50, no 4, May 2003, pp 817–39, which found 
evidence that the Federal Reserve has an informational advantage that can be used to improve monetary 
policy. 
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Given the events that have occurred since financial turmoil emerged in July 2007, I am now 
even more confident that central banks need to have the experience and perspective gained 
through bank supervision, although the institutional arrangements that can facilitate the 
acquisition of useful insights from this activity are likely to vary by country. For me, the 
information gleaned from the Federal Reserve’s role as a hands-on bank supervisor has 
been particularly useful in thinking about appropriate monetary policy in the following four 
ways. 
First, understanding the size of and basis for likely losses has been useful in highlighting 
potential financial stability issues, as well as in determining where credit availability may 
become a problem. To be sure, the degree of exposure to loss that is embedded in complex 
financial instruments has been very difficult to ascertain – for banks’ own managers, let alone 
bank supervisors – as many of the recent losses have involved complex and opaque 
financial instruments tied to the mortgage market. But that challenge notwithstanding, we 
know that the way banks are likely to behave is linked to the size of their current and 
expected future losses, which we, as supervisors with access to internal bank documents 
and interactions with bank management, can estimate. 
Second, banks’ balance sheet constraints can transmit financial shocks to the real economy. 
Banks with capital constraints may be unable to provide loans or extend credit in markets 
where they are a key source of liquidity. For central bankers to gauge potential balance sheet 
constraints, now and in the future, requires a detailed understanding of a bank’s financial 
position, capital management strategies and likely management actions. 
Third, as problems spill over from mortgage loans to other types of credit, banks’ actions can 
have a significant impact on macroeconomic growth. For example, reducing lines of credit on 
home equity loans and credit cards could have a significant impact on consumers and 
dampen economic growth. 
Fourth, many of the recent proactive steps taken by the Federal Reserve relative to discount 
window lending are facilitated and informed by its role as a bank supervisor. These steps, 
taken by the central bank in its role as a lender of last resort, make it a counterparty to 
banks, which requires an understanding of banks’ liquidity risk and solvency. 
Overview: banks and financial turmoil 
One can find numerous examples of the critical role played by banks in periods of financial 
turmoil. In the United States in the early 1990s, losses on commercial real estate and 
construction loans caused capital-constrained banks to contract their balance sheets. The 
result was that even companies with good business prospects found it difficult to secure 
adequate financing despite efforts to lower interest rates through monetary policy, causing 
the often-cited “headwinds in monetary policy”. 
A sizeable body of literature indicates that problems in Japan’s banking sector played a 
significant role in that country’s so-called “lost decade”.
3 Also, in the mid-1990s, many Asian 
                                                                                                                                                      
  In J Peek, E S Rosengren and G M B Tootell, “Identifying the macroeconomic effect of loan supply shocks”, 
Journal of Money Credit and Banking, vol 35, no 6, part 1, December 2003, pp 931–46, the authors found that 
confidential supervisory information was useful in predicting components of GDP that would likely be 
dependent on bank financing. 
3   See, for example, J Peek and E S Rosengren, “Unnatural selection: perverse incentives and the misallocation 
of credit in Japan”, American Economic Review, vol  95, no 4, September 2005, pp 1144–66; and 
R J Caballero, T Hoshi and A K Kashyap, “Zombie lending and depressed restructuring in Japan”, NBER 
Working Paper, no 12129, 2006. 8  BIS Papers No 46
 
 
countries found that their banking sectors exacerbated problems that had originated in real 
estate and foreign exchange markets. We see similar episodes in Europe as well. 
Why do banks play such critical roles during periods of financial turmoil? 
First, their balance sheet structure tends to amplify the effect of economic shocks. Banks are 
highly leveraged and highly regulated. In order to maintain their capital ratios after 
experiencing a large capital shock, banks must significantly shrink assets on their balance 
sheets – in other words, not make or acquire loans – since their ability to raise capital at such 
times can be quite limited. 
Second, while their role in financing business and residential investment has diminished in 
recent decades, banks remain the primary source of liquidity during periods of financial 
turmoil. Banks extend lines of credit, and these lines are most likely to be utilised when firms 
are experiencing financial difficulties. However, banks provide liquidity not only to firms but 
also to finance an array of complex financial instruments. For example, in the United States, 
banks have been providing liquidity to the commercial paper markets, off-balance sheet 
financial vehicles (such as conduits, special investment vehicles – SIVs – and the like) and 
municipal financing programs (for example, through auction rate securities). 
Third, banks are often the main source of financing to smaller firms and are key market-
makers in a variety of financial markets – for example, as dealers for municipal auction rate 
securities. Should they choose to shrink their balance sheets, bank-dependent borrowing 
and markets where banks are key players could be disrupted. 
In sum, understanding banks is critical to understanding how financial shocks can be 
transmitted to the real economy. Unfortunately, understanding how banks are likely to 
respond to problems requires far more than published financial statements. While US banks 
report detailed information on their balance sheets and income statements, these reports do 
not provide sufficient information to allow central banks to discern how banks are responding 
to problems. 
Estimating losses 
The current financial turbulence, like most such episodes, has unexpected sources. In 2006, 
I met with risk managers from a number of global banks. At that time the risk managers 
highlighted that they saw little risk emerging from the mortgage market. While they 
acknowledged the rapid acceleration in residential real estate prices, they emphasised that 
banks were extremely well capitalised and that internal stress tests indicated that net income 
would be lower but still positive should real estate prices decline by 10% or even 20% – in 
other words, there would be a loss of earnings but not of capital. Obviously, events have 
been more severe than that, and some of the largest financial institutions have found 
themselves needing to aggressively seek capital infusions. 
It is worth highlighting that the banks’ observations about being well capitalised were 
accurate. The attention that regulators have given to capital has caused banks in the United 
States to be much better capitalised going into these difficulties than they were in the 1990s 




Ratio of equity capital to assets at 
US commercial and savings banks, by asset size 




































































































































Large banks are banks with assets of $50 billion or more. 
Source: Commercial and savings bank Call Reports.  
The introduction of the Basel I and Basel II capital accord frameworks and of modern risk 
management techniques that focus on value-at-risk modelling has caused banks to increase 
their capital. Current problems would clearly be worse had this not occurred. Similarly, bank 
supervisors viewed banks as being in good financial health, as indicated by the very low 
number of banks considered problem institutions by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC)
4 (see Graph 2) – although there has been some additional deterioration 
recently. 
Even with the highly publicised financial turmoil that began in July, most banks remained 
profitable in 2007 (see Graph 3). While a few banks have announced very significant losses 
to date, these have been large banks actively engaged in residential mortgage securitisation. 
Both the number and the share of banks reporting losses in 2007 were well below those of 
the early 1990s. 
So how is it that the stress tests carried out by large global banks did not indicate these 
banks’ susceptibility to falling housing prices in the United States? Most of these stress tests 
assumed that lower housing prices would cause elevated losses on construction loans and 
                                                  
4    In defining problem institutions in FDIC, Quarterly Banking Profile, fourth quarter 2007,  the FDIC notes, 
“Federal regulators assign a composite rating to each financial institution, based upon an evaluation of 
financial and operational criteria. The rating is based on a scale of 1 to 5 in ascending order of supervisory 
concern. ‘Problem’ institutions are those institutions with financial, operational, or managerial weaknesses that 
threaten their continued financial viability. Depending upon the degree of risk and supervisory concern, they 
are rated either a ‘4’ or ‘5’. For all insured commercial banks and for insured savings banks for which the FDIC 
is the primary federal regulator, FDIC composite ratings are used. For all institutions whose primary federal 




5 loans, but most of the large global banks did not have significant 
exposure in those areas. 
Graph 2 



























































































































































































































































Source: FDIC, Quarterly Banking Profile.  
What these stress tests crucially failed to capture was the effect of house price declines on 
the large holdings of highly rated securities held by global banks – the products of mortgage 
securitisation activities, with their payment streams ultimately tied to the performance of 
subprime loans. In particular, they thought that housing prices nationwide were unlikely to fall 
but that, even if they did, only the high-risk slices or “tranches” of these securitised pools of 
mortgages would be affected – and the high-risk tranches were generally not held by 
                                                  
5   In essence, subprime loans are mortgage loans that have a higher risk of default than prime loans, often 
because of the borrowers’ credit history, and therefore carry higher interest rates. Certain lenders, typically 
mortgage banks, may specialise in subprime loans. Banks, especially smaller community banks, generally do 
not make subprime loans, although a few large banking organisations are active through mortgage banking 
subsidiaries. According to interagency guidance issued in 2001, “The term ‘subprime’ refers to the credit 
characteristics of individual borrowers. Subprime borrowers typically have weakened credit histories that 
include payment delinquencies and possibly more severe problems such as charge-offs, judgments, and 
bankruptcies. They may also display reduced repayment capacity as measured by credit scores, debt-to-
income ratios, or other criteria that may encompass borrowers with incomplete credit histories. Subprime 
loans are loans to borrowers displaying one or more of these characteristics at the time of origination or 
purchase. Such loans have a higher risk of default than loans to prime borrowers. Generally, subprime 
borrowers will display a range of credit risk characteristics that may include one or more of the following: Two 
or more 30-day delinquencies in the last 12 months, or one or more 60-day delinquencies in the last 
24 months; Judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or charge-off in the prior 24 months; Bankruptcy in the last 
5 years; Relatively high default probability as evidenced by, for example, a credit bureau risk score (FICO) of 
660 or below (depending on the product/collateral), or other bureau or proprietary scores with an equivalent 
default probability likelihood; and/or Debt service-to-income ratio of 50 percent or greater, or otherwise limited 
ability to cover family living expenses after deducting total monthly debt-service requirements from monthly 
income. This list is illustrative rather than exhaustive and is not meant to define specific parameters for all 
subprime borrowers. Additionally, this definition may not match all market or institution-specific subprime 
definitions, but should be viewed as a starting point from which the Agencies will expand examination efforts.” BIS Papers No 46  11
 
 
US banks. In fact, triple-A rated tranches continued to trade close to par when problems in 
subprime loans first became apparent in 2007 (see Graph 4
6). 
Graph 3 
Number and share of US commercial 
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Source: Commercial and savings bank Call Reports.  
However, since the financial turmoil starting in July, the triple-A rated securities with payment 
streams derived from subprime loans have been trading as low as 60 percent of par. Such 
values likely reflect a significant risk premium for holding mortgage-backed assets. The size 
of that risk premium is somewhat surprising, since the defaults on the underlying subprime 
assets would need to be quite severe to result in such large losses for these highest-rated 
and most secure tranches – and investors would take losses on these high-grade securities 
only after all lower-graded securities had been wiped out. 
Valuation has been made difficult by several factors – including uncertainty over both the 
number of borrowers that may eventually default on their subprime mortgage loans and the 
liquidation value of foreclosed properties in the depressed residential real estate market, and 
the large discounts that market participants have placed on complex financial assets tied to 
subprime loans. In addition, the deep discounts on highly rated securities have made 
investors sceptical of ratings as an indicator of default probabilities. With few trades taking 
place – and a large number of those trades qualifying as “distress sales” – the actual worth of 
many of instruments is difficult to determine with confidence. 
                                                  
6    According to D Greenlaw, J Hatzius, A K Kashyap and H S Shin, “Leveraged losses: lessons from the 
mortgage meltdown”, a paper presented at the 2008 US Monetary Policy Forum on 29 February 2008, “The 
ABX index represents a basket of credit default swaps linked to subprime mortgages. The indices are 




Markit ABX.HE indices 
 
Markit news releases define the Markit ABX.HE as “a synthetic index of US home equity asset-backed 
securities …. The index is a family of five sub-indices, each of which consists of a basket of 20 credit 
default swaps referencing US subprime home equity securities issued over the previous six months ….” 
The ABX.HE-06-01 index was launched on 19 January 2006. 
Source: Markit.  
However, knowing both the nature of a bank’s exposure to these assets and the possible 
pricing outcomes is critical to estimating the bank’s potential losses and its management’s 
likely responses to them, given an environment of falling housing prices and the prevalence 
of underwriting problems with many subprime loans originated after 2004. Bank supervisors 
have the ability to get detailed information on banks’ exposures and the current and possible 
future pricing of the assets.  
The importance of balance sheet constraints 
How banks manage their lending in the face of balance sheet constraints can have 
significant macroeconomic effects. If banks are unwilling to lend in the subprime and jumbo 
markets because loans in these markets are now difficult to securitise, the recovery of 
residential real estate may be impeded. If banks cut back on loans to businesses, business 
fixed investment and investment in commercial property may be impeded. If banks choose to 
reduce lines of credit to consumers, consumption may be impeded. These examples simply 
underline the fact that during a period of financial turmoil it is important for central bankers to 
understand the degree of balance sheet constraint and how banks’ management may 
choose to respond. 
As Graph 5 illustrates, during the recent financial turmoil bank assets in the United States 
have actually grown, particularly at the largest institutions. Banks have reduced their holdings 
of government securities but have expanded their holdings of other securities and 
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Balance sheet growth at US commercial 
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Note:  Large banks are banks with assets of $50 billion or more.
Other securities include all securities except government securities.
Index, 2006:Q1 = 100
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C&I Loans at Large Banks
C&I Loans at Small Banks
Other Securities at Large Banks
 
Large banks are banks with assets of $50 billion or more. Other securities include all securities except 
government securities. 
Source: Commercial and savings bank Call Reports.  
Much of this growth is probably due to “involuntary lending” – that is, banks expanding assets 
because of previous liquidity commitments made when conditions were more favourable. 
Factors contributing to the increase in balance sheet assets include the inability to roll over 
commercial paper
7 and to sell either leveraged loans originated in the expectation that they 
would be quickly distributed or assets in the process of being securitised, liquidity triggers 
forcing the purchase of municipal bonds and expanded use of lines of credit. Such factors 
can significantly swell bank assets, placing pressure on capital-constrained banks to pull 
back in other areas. And banks’ choices regarding which types of credit to shrink can have 
macroeconomic consequences. 
Predicting how a bank is likely to respond requires detailed knowledge of its assets, both on-
balance sheet and off-balance sheet, and information about which business lines each 
institution views as critical in the event it is forced to shrink its activity (in other words, to cut 
back on credit extension) in some areas. 
Indeed, calculating how constrained banks are likely to become is not straightforward, 
requiring, among other things, an understanding of the size of any possible losses that 
reduce banks’ capital. At the same time, the likely growth in bank assets can also be very 
                                                  
7   For example, as problems with mortgage-related loans emerged, some investors became reluctant to continue 
lending in the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market. This reduction in the availability of short-term 
funds caused the rates on ABCP to rise and also forced some financial institutions to buy back ABCP that they 
could no longer refinance, putting it on their balance sheets. The combination of uncertainty over the 
appropriate rating of mortgage-related securities and the expansion of bank balance sheets put significant 
pressure on the availability of short-term credit. In addition, banks, as liquidity providers, were expanding their 
balance sheets in other areas, and much of this expansion was not anticipated prior to the financial turmoil. 
Some banks have had to take writedowns on various assets, and the losses, in combination with involuntary 
growth in assets, have made some banks reluctant to expand their balance sheets further. 
Other securities at small banks 
C&I loans at small banks
Other securities at large banks
C&I loans at large banks 
2006 Q1  2006 Q2  2006 Q3  2006 Q4 2007 Q1 2007 Q2  2007 Q3  2007 Q4 
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important – and it is virtually impossible to estimate without the kinds of ongoing discussions 
bank supervisors have with bank management. 
Potential for spillover to retail consumption 
While the problems at many large banks originated with subprime mortgages and 
securitisation, policymakers and others are rightly paying attention to potential spillovers. As 
banks have seen housing prices decline, they have been reducing lines of credit associated 
with credit cards and home equity loans. The decline in home prices, which is a key driver of 
subprime defaults,
8 also erodes the value of the collateral in home equity lines. Thus, 
geographic areas that are experiencing falling home prices are likely to see a decline in the 
credit available for home equity lines, even if credit scores have not changed. 
Similarly, banks are noticing – perhaps not surprisingly – that non-performing credit card 
loans have increased more in areas with elevated home foreclosures.
9 As a result, some 
banks are re-examining their risk exposure with regard to lines of credit in areas with falling 
home prices and significant mortgage problems. 
Consumers whose credit lines are reduced or limited to loans outstanding lose an important 
financing option. To the extent that untapped lines of credit serve as a precautionary source 
of funds, consumers may be less willing to make purchases, and purchases by consumers 
who find themselves limited to current cash flow are likely to decrease.  
Let me emphasise that it is too early to determine the degree to which consumers will be 
restrained by a lack of credit in the current situation. But the central bank will be able to 
detect such trends more easily, earlier and with greater accuracy if it has supervisory 
engagement with financial institutions. 
Bank supervision and the lender of last resort 
I would argue that it is very difficult for a central bank to be an effective lender of last resort 
without significant knowledge of the current and prospective value of assets and liabilities 
held by financial institutions. Like any counterparty, a central bank acting as a lender needs 
to be able to evaluate the solvency and liquidity of a borrowing institution. 
Of course, determining the future solvency of an institution can be challenging, particularly 
when assets are difficult to value. Knowing how likely it is that an institution’s sources of 
funds will evaporate during times of financial stress requires significant understanding of the 
institution’s liabilities and its counterparty relationships. Such information has been 
particularly important of late, as the Federal Reserve has initiated a variety of innovative 
techniques to provide liquidity to the marketplace. 
Table 1 provides a list of the various initiatives taken recently by the Federal Reserve related 
to its discount window in an effort to enhance market liquidity and prevent difficulties from 
                                                  
8    See K Gerardi, A H Shapiro and P S Willen, “Subprime outcomes: risky mortgages, homeownership 
experiences and foreclosures”, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Papers, no W07-15, updated May 
2008, at www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2007/wp0715.htm . 
9   In his testimony to the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on 4 March 2008, 
Federal Reserve Board Vice Chairman Donald Kohn noted that delinquency rates on credit cards and 
consumer instalment loans had increased over the second half of 2007. He added that the Fed was 
monitoring these segments of the consumer loan market for signs of spillover from residential mortgage 
problems and that it was paying particular attention to the securitisation market for credit card loans. BIS Papers No 46  15
 
 
spreading to more institutions and, ultimately, to the real economy and individuals. Because 
of the complexity of, and institutional details involved in, each of these initiatives, today I will 
focus on just one, the Term Auction Facility. 
 
Table 1 
Recent Federal Reserve initiatives 
•    Term Auction Facility (TAF) – each auction (two per month) provides $50 billion in 
discount window loans. 
•   Expanded collateral for Fed 28-day repurchase agreements – helps dealers finance 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) – up to $100 billion. 
•   Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) – lends up to $200 billion in Treasury securities 
in return for agency and MBS. 
•   Primary Dealer Lending Facility (PDLF) – discount window loans available for primary 
dealers at the primary credit rate. 
For a complete listing of the forms of Federal Reserve lending to financial institutions, see the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York’s website, www.newyorkfed.org/markets/Forms_of_Fed_Lending.pdf. 
 
The Term Auction Facility allows banks to obtain short-term financing using, as collateral, a 
subset of assets that the marketplace currently sees as illiquid. It also provides an 
opportunity for banks to get financing for approximately one month during a period when 
obtaining such financing has sometimes proved difficult. Every other week, the Federal 
Reserve holds an auction where banks are able to use collateral to get a loan at the discount 
window. Currently, $50 billion in loans is available at each auction. The auctions have been 
well received and have generally resulted in financing rates (determined by the auction) that 
are somewhat higher than the federal funds rate. 
To qualify, a bank needs, first of all, to be in sound financial condition, as the Federal 
Reserve must have confidence that the bank will be solvent for the term of the loan. While 
determining the bank’s financial condition is left to the individual Federal Reserve Bank in 
whose district the institution resides, the Fed generally requires that the bank not have low 
supervisory ratings. Second, the institution needs to have collateral at the Federal Reserve. 
Our discount officers determine, as best they can, the market value of the collateral and 
apply an appropriate “haircut”. 
There is little question in my mind that both the determination of the potential solvency risk 
and the evaluation of the institution’s collateral are greatly aided by having experienced bank 
supervisors at the central bank. 
Conclusion 
Two years ago, few analysts anticipated significant retail credit and banking problems. At that 
time, the most recent banking problems in the United States had been driven by problems in 
commercial real estate loans. The current turmoil stems from troubles with residential real 
estate loans that are, for the most part, owned indirectly, through securitisation. 
The uncertainty surrounding the ratings applied to relatively new and opaque financial 
products and the difficulty in pricing complex financial assets have seriously disrupted the 
“originate-to-distribute” model of recent real estate finance. In particular, it is clear that 
instruments that involve financing long-term assets with short-term liabilities, without the 
backing of institutional liquidity, are not especially suited to withstand times of financial 
distress such as the one we are facing. 16  BIS Papers No 46
 
 
Today I have argued that knowledge of financial institutions has been a critical component of 
my own thinking as a central banker. In my view, a central bank incurring potential 
counterparty risk as a lender of last resort needs to have sufficient information to assess the 
solvency of its counterparty and the liquidity of the latter’s collateral – the same information 
required by private counterparties. 
Much of our understanding of the economy’s evolution since July 2007 has been greatly 
influenced by the turmoil affecting financial markets. The economy’s path will vary depending 
on the size and nature of the problems at financial institutions, the distribution of those 
problems and the reaction of bank management to them. I believe strongly that at the 
Federal Reserve, our role as bank supervisors within a central bank has greatly facilitated 
our ability to operate effectively during this challenging period. 